Components

Nada Testnet (Phase 1)

A private SVM chain enabling development of:

• attestation verification primitives

• agent-driven transaction flows

• enclave-bound oracle design

• private state transition logic

• confidential execution registry

The chain mirrors Solana but adds:

• an AttestationSysvar for storing vendor certificates

• extended compute budget for attestation parsing

• precompiles for hashing vendor certificates

Example: SVM program registry entry

pub struct MeasurementRegistry {
    pub allowed: Vec<[u8; 32]>, // SHA-256 hashes of enclave binaries
}

Nada TEEs SDK (Phase 2)

The SDK standardizes agent execution inside enclaves.

Responsibilities:

• enclave-bound key generation

• measurement calculation

• deterministic runtime initialization

• request handling: tools, RPCs, LLMs, internal state

• generation of:

  • attestation report

  • measurement + signature

  • context provenance (Merkle proofs)

  • attention selection proofs (optional)

  • output receipts

Sample TEE-side pseudocode

fn run_agent(request: AgentRequest) -> AgentReceipt {
    let measurement = sha256(enclave_binary());
    let agent_key = enclave_pubkey();
    let output = agent_execute(request);

    let ctx_proofs = make_context_proofs(&request.context);
    let signature = sign_with_enclave(&output);

    AgentReceipt {
        measurement,
        agent_pubkey: agent_key,
        output_hash: sha256(&output),
        context_proofs: ctx_proofs,
        raw_attestation: get_attestation_report(measurement, agent_key),
        signature,
    }
}

On-chain Verification (Phase 3)

Nada introduces a Solana program that verifies TEE execution receipts.

Verification steps:

1. Validate TEE Vendor Signature

verify_amd_or_intel_signature(quote)?;

1. Verify Measurement

require!(registry.allowed.contains(&receipt.measurement));

1. Verify Enclave-Bound Key

require!(receipt.agent_pubkey == signer_pubkey);

1. Verify Output Signature

let valid = signature::verify(
    &receipt.output_hash,
    &receipt.signature,
    &receipt.agent_pubkey
);
require!(valid);

1. Verify Context Merkle Proofs

for proof in receipt.context_proofs {
    verify_merkle_proof(proof)?;
}

Result:

The SVM program can trust the output’s authenticity, while the actual execution remains private.

Components

1. Nada Testnet (Phase 1)

A private SVM chain enabling development of:

• attestation verification primitives

• agent-driven transaction flows

• enclave-bound oracle design

• private state transition logic

• confidential execution registry

The chain mirrors Solana but adds:

• an AttestationSysvar for storing vendor certificates

• extended compute budget for attestation parsing

• precompiles for hashing vendor certificates

Example: SVM program registry entry

pub struct MeasurementRegistry {
    pub allowed: Vec<[u8; 32]>, // SHA-256 hashes of enclave binaries
}

---

2. Nada TEEs SDK (Phase 2)

The SDK standardizes agent execution inside enclaves.

Responsibilities:

• enclave-bound key generation

• measurement calculation

• deterministic runtime initialization

• request handling: tools, RPCs, LLMs, internal state

• generation of:

  • attestation report

  • measurement + signature

  • context provenance (Merkle proofs)

  • attention selection proofs (optional)

  • output receipts

Sample TEE-side pseudocode

fn run_agent(request: AgentRequest) -> AgentReceipt {
    let measurement = sha256(enclave_binary());
    let agent_key = enclave_pubkey();
    let output = agent_execute(request);

    let ctx_proofs = make_context_proofs(&request.context);
    let signature = sign_with_enclave(&output);

    AgentReceipt {
        measurement,
        agent_pubkey: agent_key,
        output_hash: sha256(&output),
        context_proofs: ctx_proofs,
        raw_attestation: get_attestation_report(measurement, agent_key),
        signature,
    }
}

---

3. On-chain Verification (Phase 3)

Nada introduces a Solana program that verifies TEE execution receipts.

Verification steps:

1. Validate TEE Vendor Signature

verify_amd_or_intel_signature(quote)?;

1. Verify Measurement

require!(registry.allowed.contains(&receipt.measurement));

1. Verify Enclave-Bound Key

require!(receipt.agent_pubkey == signer_pubkey);

1. Verify Output Signature

let valid = signature::verify(
    &receipt.output_hash,
    &receipt.signature,
    &receipt.agent_pubkey
);
require!(valid);

1. Verify Context Merkle Proofs

for proof in receipt.context_proofs {
    verify_merkle_proof(proof)?;
}

Result:

The SVM program can trust the output’s authenticity, while the actual execution remains private.

---

4. Confidential Layer for Public SVM Chains (Phase 4)

In this phase, Nada becomes a module that any SVM chain can integrate, allowing:

• private smart contracts

• confidential intents

• private order matching

• TEE-backed oracles

• verifiable AI agents on Solana

Nada functions as:

A sidechain-agnostic verification oracle for confidential execution.

Developers write:

• standard Solana programs

• plus optional callback hooks for confidential verification

Example on Solana:

pub fn verify_agent(ctx: Context<VerifyAgent>, receipt: AgentReceipt) -> Result<()> {
    nada::verify_attestation(&ctx.accounts.nada_sysvar, &receipt)?;
    // Continue with private state transition
}